The Pakistani Spectator

PAKISTAN UNDER MUSHARRAF

Government and Politics

1999-2008

By

Amicus

 

 

Between November 1988 and February 1997, the troika comprising the President, the Prime Minister and the Chief of Army Staff ruled the country, reflecting the reality of a power-equation that in practice was not very stable. Despite the system’s parliamentary façade, it was understood that the armed forces would have a decisive say in the matters of defense and foreign policy, including Pakistan’s, then, clandestine nuclear program and its agenda in Afghanistan and Kashmir.

Intoxicated with what was referred to as a “heavy mandate”, given in the elections of February 1997, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif transgressed the limits imposed on his power by the informal system of troika.

His government introduced the Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution that, inter alia, did away with article 58 (2) (b) and thereby deprived the President of the power to dissolve the National Assembly, if in his opinion the government of the federation could not be carried on in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution and an appeal to the electorate had become necessary. Under the Thirteenth Amendment, the Prime Minister acquired once again the power to appoint the Services’ Chiefs.

Perhaps, without taking the General Head Quarters (GHQ), (the most important element of the TROIKA), into full confidence, Nawaz Sharif, intoxicated by his, ‘heavy’, mandate, proceeded, in haste, to improve relations with India, creating a big media hype on Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpee’s bus yatra to Lahore in early 1999. The Lahore Declaration made on the occasion was projected as a major breakthrough towards the normalization of relations with India, including progress on the Kashmir issue. It was a non-starter.

It appeared that in contrast to the policy of rapprochement with India, Pakistan, under Nawaz Sharif, went for the Kargil adventure during which the Mujahideens and some elements of Para-military forces of Pakistan, occupied a number of strategic mountain peaks and established heavily armed posts across the Line of Control (LoC), resulting in a mini India- Pakistan war in the region in May-June 1999.

As an all-out confrontation with India appeared imminent, Nawaz Sharif, rushed to the United States to seek President Bill Clinton’s intervention and agreed to withdraw Pakistani troops without any quid pro quo, without having any regard to the sacrifices given by the hundreds, if not thousands.

In the midst of the crisis the serious differences between the Prime Minister and the Chief of Army Staff became publicly known with General Musharraf asserting, rightly so, that Nawaz Sharif was aware of the plan to cross the LoC.

After the Kargil war, the relations between Nawaz Sharif and General Pervez Musharraf (read the Defense Establishment) were damaged beyond repair. Although Nawaz Sharif appointed General Musharraf as Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (CJCSC), to dispel negative impression. Informed people knew that beneath the surface things were not normal.

Nawaz Sharif had earlier sent President Mohammad Farooq Leghari, Chief Justice Sajjad Ali Shah and COAS General Jehangir Karamat home; and the Armed Forces rightly anticipated that he might attempt to remove General Pervez Musharaf any time.

Over-confident and now more reckless, Nawaz Sharif announced, in the late afternoon of 12 October 1999, the dismissal of General Musharraf as the COAS, precisely when the General was about to board or was already on board a PIA aircraft on his return journey from Colombo where he had represented Pakistan.

Nawaz Sharif intended to appoint his hand picked and trusted man, Lt. General Zia ud Din, then incumbent chief of ISI, as the COAS. It is another matter that the incumbent, as DG ISI, failed, misread or deliberately misled Nawaz Shareef, into his last, suicidal and foolish act.

However, his “appointee” was not allowed to take charge by the Army Commanders, as per anticipatory decisions taken earlier by the Armed Forces of Pakistan in the then prevailing and predictable environment, at GHQ Rawalpindi.

Nawaz Sharif panicked and ordered the diversion of the PIA plane, carrying General Musharraf, to some neighboring country even if it was to be India and subsequently, as a last resort, to Nawab Shah.

The high drama continued for hours, for whole of the country and the world to watch. Besides, the Chief of the Army Staff, other officials, 200 odd passengers of a regular PIA flight from Colombo. All these precious lives were, knowingly put at peril of certain deaths. A situation was created where state institutions were put to work at cross purposes and a confrontation course.

This was the height of abuse and misuse of powers, the powers, those were supposed to be a sacred trust from the people of Pakistan.

The Corps Commander of Karachi acted very swiftly to take the situation under his control, and General Pervez Musharraf landed safely at the Jinnah Terminal, Karachi.

Within a few hours, it was announced on Radio and Television that the armed forces had seized power and General Musharraf was in command.

In the early hours of 13 October 1999, General Musharraf addressed the nation and referred to the turmoil and uncertainty through which the country had lately passed. He charged that all the institutions had been systematically destroyed and economy was in a state of collapse; self serving policies were being followed which had rocked the very foundation of the Federation of Pakistan. His address was widely welcomed and people of Pakistan heaved a sigh of relief from the most agonizing and frustrating moments in its short history.

He accused Nawaz Sharif’s government of trying to politicize the army, to destabilize it and to create dissensions within its ranks. He also stated that Nawaz Sharif ordered to divert his PIA flight to some destination outside Pakistan, despite shortage of fuel, which imperiled the life of all the passengers. He assured the nation:

“Your armed forces have never and shall never let you down. Insha-allah, we shall preserve the integrity and sovereignty of our country to the last drop of our blood. I request you all to remain calm and support your armed forces in the re-establishment of order to pave the way for a prosperous future for Pakistan.”

(For full text, see Pakistan Perspectives, Karachi: Pakistan Study Centre, University of Karachi, July-December 1999, pp.147-149.)

As one of its first steps, the military government made the Proclamation of Emergency on 14 October 1999 and, apart from that of CJCSC and the COAS, General Pervez Musharraf assumed the office of the “Chief Executive” of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. On the same day, the Provisional Constitutional Order No. 1 of 1999 was issued which, inter alia, provided:

2. (1) Notwithstanding the abeyance of the provisions of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, referred to as the Constitution, Pakistan shall, subject to this Order and any other Orders made by the Chief Executive, be governed, as nearly as may be, in accordance with the Constitution.

3. (2) No judgment, decree, writ, order or process whatsoever shall be made or issued by any court or tribunal against the Chief Executive or any authority designated by the Chief Executive.

(For full text, see Pakistan Perspectives, July-December 1999, p. 149-150)

On 17 October 1999, General Musharraf addressed the nation and articulated his government’s aims and objectives, and future policy. He stated that the country had reached a stage where its economy had crumbled, its credibility was lost, state institutions lay demolished, provincial disharmony had caused cracks in the federation, and people who were once brothers were at each other’s throat.

He declared that he would not allow the people to be taken back to the era of “sham democracy” but to a true one. He promised that the Constitution had only been temporarily held in abeyance and that the armed forces had no intention to stay in charge any longer than was absolutely necessary to pave the way for true democracy to flourish in Pakistan.

General Musharraf was not extravagant in framing charges against the Nawaz Sharif government. Nawaz Sharif’s rule was stained by massive corruption, financial mismanagement and an insatiable lust for power and self-aggrandizement. He had converted the Parliament into rubber-stamp, browbeaten the press (Jang group of newspapers-a case in point) and had not even spared the Supreme Court whose sanctity was blatantly violated through physical assault.

As regards the aims and objectives of his government, General Musharraf identified a seven-point agenda:

1. Rebuild national confidence and morale.

2. Strengthen Federation, remove inter-provincial disharmony and restore national cohesion.

3. Revive economy and restore investor confidence.

4. Ensure law and order and dispense speedy justice.

5. Depoliticize state institutions.

6. Devolution of power to the grass-roots level.

7. Ensure swift and across the board accountability.

“Good governance is the pre-requisite to achieve these objectives. In the past, our governments have ruled the people. It is time now for the governments to serve the people,” proudly declared the General.

With regard to his government’s structure, General Musharraf announced that President Rafique Tarar had very kindly agreed to stay. There would be a National Security Council headed by the Chief Executive and including Chief of Naval Staff, Chief of Air Staff, a specialist each in legal, finance, foreign policy and national affairs. A Cabinet of Ministers would work under the guidance of the National Security Council (NSC).

In provinces, there would be a Governor, functioning through a small provincial cabinet. “All these appointments shall be made purely on the basis of professional competence, merit and repute,” General Musharraf assured the nation.

Emphasizing the need to strengthen the federation, General Musharraf announced that this was to be achieved through “devolution of power, from the centre to the province and from the provincial to the local government as actually enshrined in the Constitution.”

As a part of good governance, General Musharraf undertook to initiate a process of accountability. Without naming anyone (perhaps he had General Zia-ul Haq and Nawaz Sharif in his mind), he said that the term “ehtesab” had been abused to an extent that it had lost its meaning and there was a need to re-establish faith in the process of accountability.

He added: “The process of accountability is being directed especially towards those guilty of plundering and looting the national wealth and tax evaders. It is also directed towards loan defaulters and those who have had their loans re-scheduled or condoned. The process of accountability will be transparent for the public to see.” He advised the “guilty” to return voluntarily national wealth and bank loans, and pay their debts within a month, after which the law was to take its due course.

Referring to the menace of religious intolerance, General Musharraf stated that Islam taught “tolerance not hatred, universal brotherhood and not enmity, peace and not violence, progress and not bigotry.” He urged upon the ulema to curb elements that were exploiting religion for vested interests and bringing bad name to Islam. He reassured the minorities that they would enjoy full rights and protection as equal citizens of Pakistan in letter and spirit of true Islam. (For full text, see Pakistan Perspectives, July-December 1999, pp.150-155)

The objectives of his government having thus been set, General Musharraf needed to translate them into reality. Simultaneously, he was required to face the political forces in the arena and to get legitimacy for having committed constitutional deviation, if not outright subversion of the Constitution.

In November 1999, two important institutions were set up. One was the National Accountability Bureau (NAB), to deal with the cases of corruption, and another was National Reconstruction Bureau (NRB), to formulate policy / strategy options for national reconstruction, including establishment of “genuine democracy”, for approval by NSC.

By mid-November, it became apparent that banks and financial institutions had failed to make any appreciable recovery out of the total estimated amount of Rs. 356 billion payable by defaulters as on 12 October 1999. (This figure was cited by the Supreme Court in the Zafar Ali Shah case from a report of the Governor, State Bank of Pakistan.)

The people pinned their expectations on the NAB as an instrument to curb corrupt practices and recover ill-gotten wealth, but they were soon to be disappointed as the NAB, after its initial zeal and robustness that led to some admirable performances, fell prey to political expediency and was ultimately used for coercing the politicians to change their loyalties.

The performance of the NRB was better in the sense that it did come up with a devolution plan that introduced some fundamental changes in the structure of government at district level.

As far as political forces were concerned, Benazir Bhutto, Chairperson of Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), who was in exile to avoid imprisonment and further prosecution on corruption charges framed by the Nawaz Sharif government, welcomed the military takeover, perhaps in the hope that the Musharraf government would seek the PPP’s support in filling the political vacuum and would in due course hold fair and transparent elections.

Although in the prevalent scenario, the PPP appeared to be the natural ally of General Musharraf, no understanding could be reached between the two; in the first place, because Benazir Bhutto was not prepared to accept any permanent role for the armed forces in national politics and, secondly, because General Musharraf himself did not want to carry any past baggage when the people, who were fed up with eleven years of political bickering, instability and rampant corruption, had shown considerable warmth for the army takeover.

On 10 November 1999, a case was registered against Nawaz Sharif on the charges of criminal conspiracy to hijack the PIA aircraft in which General Musharraf was returning from Colombo. Two days later, his political associates, Ghous Ali Shah, Shahid Khaqan Abbasi, Rana Maqbool and Ameenullah Chaudhry were arrested in the same case.

On 6 April 2000, Judge Rehmat Hussain Jafri of Anti-terrorism Court in Karachi sentenced Nawaz Sharif to life imprisonment, fined him Rs. 3 million and ordered confiscation of his property. Although the Court convicted the former Prime Minister for hijacking and terrorism, he was acquitted of the charges of kidnapping and attempted murder. In July the same year, Nawaz Sharif was also convicted on the charges of corruption.

With Nawaz Sharif behind the bars for an indefinite period, Begum Kulsoom Nawaz rose to the occasion to lead the agitation by the Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz) for the release of her husband; whereas several pragmatic stalwarts of PML (N) left the party in search of greener pastures. They were ultimately to form the Pakistan Muslim League (Quaid-i-Azam) at the agencies’ bidding.

Despite the bar imposed by the PCO, the legitimacy of the military takeover came into question when, on 6 December 1999 and its immediate aftermath, the Supreme Court admitted several petitions under Article 184 (3) of the Constitution challenging the action of 12 October 1999.

The Musharraf government responded by issuing Oath of Office (Judges) Order No. 1 of 2000 with precise provisions that a judge, to whom oath was to be administered, should abide by the provisions of Proclamation of Emergency of 14 October 1999 and Provisional Constitutional Order No. 1 of 1999. Several Judges of the Supreme Court and the High Courts, including the Chief Justice of Pakistan, Justice Saiduzzaman Siddique, refused to take fresh oath under this Order.

After regular hearings of the constitutional petitions, the Supreme Court delivered its Short Order (Judgment) on 12 May 2000, in which it observed:

“Notwithstanding anything contained in the Proclamation of Emergency of the Fourteenth day of October, 1999, the Provisional Constitution Order No.1 of 1999 . . . . and the Oath of Office (Judges) Order No.1 of 2000, all of which purportedly restrained this Court from calling in question or permitting to call in question the validity of any of the provisions thereof, this Court, in the exercise of its inherent powers of judicial review, has the right to examine the validity of the aforesaid instruments.”

However, the apex Court took notice of corruption, mis-management and institutional failures under the Nawaz Sharif government, and delivered the judgment in favor of General Musharraf.

The Supreme Court, inter alia, stated:

“ With the repeal of Article 58 (2) (b) of the Constitution, there was no remedy provided in the Constitution to meet the situation like the present one with which the country was confronted, therefore, constitutional deviation made by the Chief of the Army Staff, General Pervez Musharaf, for the welfare of the people rather than abrogating the Constitution or imposing Martial Law by means of an extra-constitutional measure is validated for a transitional period on ground of State necessity and on the principle that it is in public interest to accord legal recognition to the present regime with a view to achieving his declared objectives and that it is in the interest of the community that order be preserved.”

Although the Supreme Court accorded legitimacy to the army takeover, some of the very significant points of the judgment were:

4. That the 1973 Constitution still remains the supreme law of the land subject to the condition that certain parts thereof have been held in abeyance on account of State necessity.

6 (ii). Those constitutional amendments by the Chief Executive can be resorted to only if the Constitution fails to provide a solution for attainment of his declared objectives. . . .

- (iii). That no amendment shall be made in the salient features of the Constitution i.e., independence of judiciary, federalism, and parliamentary form of government blended with Islamic provisions.

- (vi). That the Superior Courts continue to have the power of judicial review to judge the validity of any act or action of the Armed Forces . . . .

10. That the government shall accelerate the process of accountability in a coherent and transparent manner justly, fairly, equitably and in accordance with law.

17. That having regard to all the relevant factors involved in the case . . . . three years period is allowed to the Chief Executive with effect from the date of the Army takeover i.e., 12th October, 1999 for achieving his declared objectives.

18. That the Chief Executive shall appoint a date, not later than 90-days before the expiry of the aforesaid period of three years, for holding of a general elections to the National Assembly and the Provincial Assemblies and the Senate of Pakistan.

(For full text, see Pakistan Perspectives, January-June 2000, pp. 139- 148)

Even before the Supreme Court announced this judgment, in what came to be known as the Zafar Ali Shah Case, General Musharraf had unveiled the outline of his proposed plan on devolution of power and responsibility.

Addressing the nation on 23 March 2000, he declared:

a) Our existing administrative system is based on a colonial structure of control / rule rather than serve, with no community participation in development.

b) In the present political structure there is a political void below the provincial level. This is exploited by our so-called representatives, who control the destiny of the people through vested personal / family interests.

So:

We want to change this. We want to empower the people at the grass-roots level and also bring an end to centralist tendencies threatening provincial autonomy.

The political structure, we plan, involves a trilateral distribution of responsibilities between the centre, the provinces and the district representing the basic (lowest) rung of democracy.

(For full text, see Pakistan Perspectives, January-June, 2000, pp. 134-139)

In the same address, General Musharraf announced that the elections for local bodies would be held in two stages and all governments / council’s upto district level would be in place by 14 August 2001. He sought a debate on national media before the proposed devolution plan could be given the final shape.

By opting to rely on local bodies as a source of support for his government, General Musharraf was repeating the scripts of former military rulers of Pakistan, General Mohammad Ayub Khan and General Mohammmad Zia-ul Haq, both of whom had constructed local government systems with the intention to develop a support base by creating a fresh crop of leaders with vested interests.

To further weaken the rival political forces, General Musharraf issued a decree on 9 August 2000 that amended the Political Parties Act, disqualifying those convicted of “criminal offences, moral turpitude or offences under the Anti-Terrorist Act” from holding party offices.

Obviously, the targets of this legislation were Benazir Bhutto and Mian Nawaz Sharif who, at one time or other, had been convicted by special courts.

The PPP and the PML (N), purely motivated by the “survival instinct” responded in November 2000 by forging a grand anti-Musharraf alliance that included some fifteen other smaller parties and was subsequently to emerge as Alliance for Restoration of Democracy (ARD).

Before the new alliance could make any impact on the scenario, in one of the most bizarre incidents of Pakistani politics, on 9 December 2000, General Musharraf granted a presidential pardon to Nawaz Sharif and his brother, former Chief Minister of Punjab, Mian Shahbaz Sharif, who, along with most of their family members, left for a ten-year exile to Saudi Arabia in the middle of the night under a secret deal brokered by the Saudi authorities.

With Benazir Bhutto already in self-exile since April 1998, and her husband, Asif Ali Zardari, behind the bars since November 1996, the political scenario was favorable for General Musharraf to move ahead with his agenda.

On 20 June 2001, ahead of Agra Summit with the Indian Prime Minister, Atal Bihari Vajpee, President Tarar was obliged to step down and General Musharraf became the President of Pakistan.

In the meantime, the Local Government Plan (LGP) had been finalized. It proposed a three-tiered system of elected councils at union, tehsil / town and district levels.

The administrative and financial powers of the divisions were to be transferred to the District Governments under their respective Nazim and Naib Nazim to be elected by the members of the directly elected Union Councils.

The District Nazim was to exercise formal authority over civilian bureaucracy, including the District Coordination Officer (DCO). The LGP also called for providing sufficient funds to local governments so that they could carry out their functions independently and properly.

The elections for the different tiers of the local government were held throughout the country, in stages, from December 2000 to July 2001. They, presumably, were held on “non-party” basis. However, the government ignored the fact that the political parties, including the PPP and the PML (N), had sponsored their respective groups.

By 14 August 2001 the local governments were in place as per schedule. Although the devolution plan was supposedly meant to empower people at grassroots level, this pious claim remained largely unfulfilled, particularly in rural areas where the system further strengthened the landlords.

Without bringing about fundamental changes in rural power-structure based on feudal model and values, the system was destined to be hampered in delivering real benefits to the toiling masses.

The system was relatively more successful in urban areas where local bodies launched many development projects. Perhaps the real beneficiary was Karachi where the city government enjoyed considerable independence from the provincial authority in managing its affairs.

Since the assumption of office, General Musharraf had projected himself as a liberal in social matters and had made no secret of his admiration for Mustafa Kemal, the secularist founder of modern Turkey.

He had time and again expressed his concern about burgeoning sectarianism, religious orthodoxy and attitude of intolerance towards the minorities in the country. In fact, as early as April 2000, General Musharraf had announced to introduce procedural changes in the controversial blasphemy laws to protect the minorities from its misapplication. He had also intended to amend the hudood laws that were seen by many as discriminatory towards women.

But he had failed to introduce contemplated changes in the aforementioned laws due to strong opposition from the religious parties. In August 2001 General Musharraf announced a ban on sectarian outfits, Lashkar-i-Jangvi and Sipah-i-Mohammad. However, the banned out-fits soon reemerged under other names.

After the cataclysmic events of 9/11, General Musharraf made Pakistan an ally of international coalition against “terrorism” and became exponent of “enlightened moderation”. After the protests and emotional outburst against his ditching of the Taliban subsided, he found himself more firmly entrenched in power. By becoming the darling of the United States in its “war on terrorism”, General Musharraf could now think of playing a long innings like General Zia-ul Haq.

As the deadline to hold elections under the Supreme Court judgment was drawing nearer, General Musharraf decided to tread the path of General Zia-ul Haq. In his address of 5 April 2002, he recounted his government’s progress on various points of his initial agenda, namely:

i) Rebuild national confidence and morale: “We can now see a sense of confidence among Pakistanis both at home and abroad.”

ii) Strengthen federation, remove inter-provincial disharmony and restore national cohesion: “. . . our even-handed policy toward the four provinces will further enhance inter-provincial harmony.”

iii) Revive economy and restore investor confidence: “We have indeed revived the economy and taken it out from a failed state situation.”

iv) Ensure law and order and dispense speedy justice: “We have undertaken far-reaching reforms.”

v) Depoliticize state institutions: “. . . nothing is being done on personal whims.”

vi) Devolution of power to the grass-roots level: “. . . the local government has been functioning since last August.”

vii) Ensuring swift and across the board accountability: “. . . no government in the past or even in the future will be able to match our performance.”

General Musharraf stated that the focus of his development strategy had been on four issues:

i) Economic revival

ii) Bringing good governance

iii) Poverty alleviation

iv) Political restructuring

He highlighted the performance of his government by emphasizing that it had brought down fiscal deficit from 7 percent to 5.2 percent, the exchange reserves had increased from $ 500 million to $ 5.3 billion and foreign debt had slightly decreased from $ 38 billion. He claimed that all this could not be attributed to 9/11 because the foreign exchange reserves had crossed the $ 3 billion mark by July 2001.

After speaking at length on development strategy and performance of his government, General Musharraf came to the issue of his continuation in office:

i) What is my personal role? Am I required for Pakistan? Is there any role for me?

ii) What should be the environment of the assembly and the cabinet in post-October period? . . . I am saying that if I have a role in the post-October Pakistan then I should have the right kind of interaction with the prime minister, the cabinet and the National Assembly otherwise democracy will stand where it was.

Read again: “. . . the right kind of interaction with the Prime Minister, the Cabinet and the National Assembly. . . .” His answer to the questions he himself posed was that a referendum would be held in the country because he needed to be sure that the entire nation wanted the continuity of the reforms and the restructuring that he had introduced.

(Pakistan Perspectives, January-June, 2002, pp. 220-237.)

On 9 April 2002, General Musharraf as the Chief Executive and President issued Chief Executive’s Order No. 12 of 2002 for holding of a referendum on 30 April 2002. The order invited the people to reply in ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to the following question:

“Do you wish to make President General Musharraf president of Pakistan for the next five years __ for the survival of the system of local government, for the continuity and consolidation of reforms, for an end to sectarianism and extremism, and for the realization of the Quaid-i-Azam’s vision?”

Section 4 of the Order stated:

“4(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Constitution or any law for the time being in force, if the majority of the votes cast in the referendum are in the affirmative, the people of Pakistan shall be deemed to have given the democratic mandate to General Pervez Musharraf to serve the nation as President of Pakistan for a period of five years. .”

This Order was immediately challenged in the Supreme Court under article 184 (3) on the constitutional plane as well as on the touchstone of the Supreme Court’s verdict in the Syed Zafar Ali Shah case. On 27 April 2002, the Supreme Court gave a short order validating the holding of the referendum. Significantly the Supreme Court’s Order stated:

13. As regards the grounds of challenge to the consequences flowing from the holding of referendum under the Referendum Order, apparently these questions are purely academic, hypothetical and presumptive in nature and are not capable of being determined at this juncture. Accordingly, we would not like to go into these questions at this stage and leave the same to be determined at a proper forum at the appropriate time.

(Pakistan Perspectives, January-June, 2002, pp. 237-249.)

According to official figures 42.8 million out of 43.9 million voters cast their votes in “yes” and this made up a good 97.7 percent. In fact the turnout of the voters was very low and, since the whole exercise was essentially in conflict with the Supreme Court judgment in the Zafar Ali Shah case, it did not go well with the liberal intelligentsia in the country. Human Rights Commission of Pakistan’s Report on the referendum observed:

“Observers monitoring the referendum for HRCP reported overall turn-out to be very low, and well below the official figures put forward. This was particularly true of women, who remained almost entirely absent from polling stations in all four provinces. It was also noted that the polling that did take place largely came either as a result of balloting by ‘captive’ voters’ i.e., government employees, factory workers, and prisoners and so on or through the efforts of district administrations. Indeed, the large-scale misuse of official machinery to bolster balloting was noted almost everywhere with vehicles seized for this purpose being controlled by nazims and councilors. The councilors themselves remained under immense pressure to bring in votes to polling stations. The impounding of public transport vehicles to convey voters to polls also presented huge inconveniences to ordinary people.

“The lack of measures to prevent multiple voting meant that this continued on a significant scale. Reports of ballot boxes being stuffed also came in from every province.”

As far as results were concerned, only the extraordinary high percentage of “yes” votes seemed unrealistic, otherwise, after the people watched the destruction of Afghanistan on the T.V. channels and learned about the treatment meted out to Pakistani volunteers in Afghanistan, victory for General Musharraf was a foregone conclusion. Later General Musharraf had to concede that the exercise of referendum suffered from certain flaws.

The next logical step was to tailor a system that would have ensured that General Musharraf, or in other words the armed forces, remained at the helm of affairs even after the promised General Elections were held on 10 October 2002.

For this purpose, on 21 August 2002 General Musharraf issued the Legal Framework Order (LFO), 2002, with a view to drastically amend the Constitution of 1973 as its various provisions were to be revived.

The most significant amendments under the LFO included the restoration of Article 58 (2) (b), which was about the powers of the President to dissolve the National Assembly, and insertion of a new Article 152 (a) that provided for creation of a National Security Council “to serve as a forum for consultation on strategic matters pertaining to the sovereignty, integrity and security of the State; and the matters relating to democracy, governance and inter-provincial harmony.”

The President was to be the Chairman of the National Security Council and its other members were to be the Prime Minister, the Chairman of the Senate, the Speaker of the National Assembly, the Leader of the Opposition in the National Assembly, the Chief Ministers of the Provinces, the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, and the Chief of Staffs of the Pakistan Army, Pakistan Navy and Pakistan Air Force.

The LFO also contained provisions concerning the validation of laws framed and Orders issued since 12 October 1999, legitimizing the referendum of 30 April 2002, under which General Musharraf was to serve as President for next five years, and the newly determined strength and composition of the National Assembly, the Senate and the Provincial Assemblies.

With this the various government departments and agencies geared up to achieve results that would have served the interests of the military government. General Musharraf decided to patronize the PML (Q), led by Chaudhry Shujaat, and comprising defectors from PML (N) and other political parties, traditional collaborators of the armed forces, time-servers and weathercocks.

Due to unabashed government support, the party became notorious as the ‘King’s Party’. The real stakeholders ___ the Pakistan People’s Party, which participated as the PPP Parliamentarian, and the Pakistan Muslim League (N) ___ were put at a disadvantage by the disqualification of Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif from taking part in the electoral process.

Six religious parties grouped themselves into the Muttahida Majlis-i-Amal (MMA) and in the wake of the sympathy wave created by the US invasion of Afghanistan, emerged as an important force in the political arena.

According to LFO, there were to be 272 directly elected members in the National Assembly with further 60 seats reserved for women and 10 seats for minorities. As a result of pre-poll manipulations and necessary engineering on the polls day, the PML (Q) secured 76 (+1) seats with 25.7 percent of total votes, the PPPP 62 (+1) seats with 25.8 percent of total votes and the MMA 45 (+6) seats with 11.3 percent of total votes. The PML (N) captured only 14, the Muttahida Quami Movement (MQM) 13 and the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) 13 seats.

The rest of the seats for which polling was held went to minor parties/groups and the independents. This was followed by indirect elections for the seats of women and minorities. In due course, the Senate was also elected.

In order to facilitate the formation of a coalition government led by the PML (Q), General Musharraf amended the Political Parties Act for a short period to allow defections of elected members from other political parties. Ultimately, on 21 November 2002, the PML (Q)’s Zafarullah Khan Jamali was elected as the Prime Minister mainly with the support of the NDA, the MQM, the PPPP turncoats, who became the PPP Patriots, the PPP (Sherpao) and the independents. Jamali received 172 votes in the National Assembly. The Opposition could not field a united candidate.

The MMA’s Maulana Fazlur Rehman received 86 and the PPP Parliamentarian’s Shah Mehmood Qureshi 70 votes.

Although the military’s relations with the religious parties had come under considerable strains, the establishment’s anti-PPP and anti-PML (N) policies had facilitated the MMA in securing substantial presence in the National Assembly, the Senate and the Balochistan Assembly, and a majority in the NWFP Assembly.

Instead of going along with the ARD i.e., the PPP Parliamentarian, the PML (N) and other Opposition groups, the MMA formed its government in the NWFP and became a coalition partner with the PML (Q) in Balochistan.

From the very first session, the Opposition raised the issue of the LFO and refused to accept it as a part of the Constitution. The Opposition demanded the restoration of the Constitution of 1973 without any substantial amendments on the part of the military government.

However, it was in catch 22 because the General Elections had been held according to provisions of the LFO. The Opposition primarily directed its protest against the restoration of the Article 58 (2) (b) and the formation of National Security Council.

The protests against the LFO, made it impossible for the National Assembly to function in a normal fashion. Besides, without the approval of the Parliament, the constitutional amendments, including those related to the validity of laws framed by the military government and the referendum of April 2002 lacked legitimacy. But it took a year before the PML (Q) and the MMA arrived at a compromise formula.

On 24 December 2003, the ruling PML (Q) and the MMA signed an agreement on the constitutional amendment package. Reportedly under the deal the PML (Q), inter alia, agreed that the National Security Council would be set up under an act of the Parliament rather than as a constitutional body; the President’s decision to dissolve the National Assembly under Article 58 (2) (b) would be referred to the Supreme Court within 15 days; the President would seek vote of confidence from the electoral college; the President would consult the Prime Minister on the appointment of armed forces chiefs, although he would not be bound by the advice of the Prime Minister; and the President would give up his uniform by 31 December 2004.

It was clarified that the amendment giving President continuity in office for the ongoing term would be supported but the members of the MMA would not be bound to cast vote of confidence for the President in the Senate, the National Assembly and the Provincial Assemblies. Simultaneously, the MMA members would not cast votes against the President nor would they oppose the confidence motion through any activity, and they would remain present in the Parliament and the Provincial Assemblies at the time of confidence motion for the President. (Dawn, 25 December, 2003)

Accordingly, General Musharraf, addressed the nation in which he pledged to give up his uniform by 31 December 2004. As per agreement, the MMA voted with the ruling coalition for the passage of the Seventeenth Amendment to the Constitution, which was based on the LFO as modified under the PML (Q) -MMA agreement, and General Musharraf secured vote of confidence from the Parliament and the Provincial Assemblies.

The MMA claimed that it had provided an exit to the military by extracting a public commitment from General Musharraf to give up his uniform by 31 December 2004 and by reducing the National Security Council to a non-constitutional body.

Apparently everything was working according to the script. But in fact the pitfalls of the system were becoming visible to the discerning eyes from the very beginning. The selection of Zafarullah Khan Jamali as the Prime Minister demonstrated what was in the stock for the people. From the outset, he failed to display any initiative or infuse life into the system. Compliant to the point of absurdity, he acted merely at the bidding of General Musharraf showing absolutely no spine.

After nearly one and half year, General Musharraf realized that he needed to impart some cosmetic changes if the dispensation was to survive and give hope to the people. In the midst of a whispering campaign about the failure of the system, he also wanted to prove that he was firmly in the saddles and was calling the shots.

Zafarullah Khan Jamali was made to resign on 26 June 2004 without use of Article 58 (2) (b). The amusing farce of Chaudhry Shujaat’s acting as the stopover Prime Minister paved the way for Shaukat Aziz to take over the assignment on 27 August 2004.

Impression was created that Pakistan required a technocrat, and Aziz with his expertise had a magical wand to improve the lot of the people. Whatever be the performance of the economy at macro level, the harsh reality had remained that no real benefits were trickling down to the common man.

As 31 December 2004 drew nearer, some Ministers and members of the Parliament started airing the views that General Musharraf was indispensable and that his remaining in the uniform was in national interest. General Musharraf was fully aware that not the presidency but the office of the COAS was the source of his strength.

He also started giving indications that he might have to remain in uniform to ensure the continuation of his policies. On 14 October 2004, the National Assembly, taking advantage of a technical flaw or loophole in the Seventeenth Amendment, passed a law,( President to Hold Another Office Act, 2004 Act No. VII of 2004 November 30, 2004 ), to enable General Musharraf to retain his dual role as President and Chief of Army Staff in order to maintain the “ integrity and stability of the state” and to “combat terrorism and subversion.”

The MMA found itself in a difficult position. To save its credibility, it started holding public meetings to press General Musharraf to shed his uniform and threatened to launch an agitational movement from 1 January 2005, if General Musharraf failed to keep his pledge.

General Musharraf had, perhaps, made up his mind quite earlier to remain in uniform and, in order to preempt MMA-ARD collaboration; he had entered into negotiations with the PPP on future political set-up. The release of Asif Ali Zardari on bail and his subsequent statements created impression that considerable progress towards a deal with the PPP had been made and 2005 would be the election year.

On 30 December 2004, General Musharraf formally announced that he intended to retain his office of the Chief of Army Staff till the end of his presidential term in 2007. The MMA’s so-called agitation against General Musharraf’s remaining in uniform fizzled out after a few demonstrations and public meetings. In fact, the MMA understood that if General Musharraf really forged an understanding with the PPP and fresh elections were held, it was almost certain to lose substantial electoral support and would not be able to form government in the NWFP or have the same weight in the future National Assembly.

General Musharraf thus survived the critical phase without much ado because neither the MMA nor the ARD posed any serious threat to the system. The anticipated Musharraf-Benazir understanding did not materialize.

Well into 2005, the next important landmark was the local body’s elections that were held on “non-party basis” at Union Council level in August amidst allegations of large scale rigging. With Arbab Ghulam Rahim at the helm of affairs in Sindh and Chaudhry Pervaiz Elahi in Punjab, the PML (Q) for all practical purposes routed the PPP and PML (N) backed candidates in the Punjab and rural Sindh. Karachi and greater part of Hyderabad went to the MQM.

In the NWFP and Balochistan also, the PML (Q) made a dent in the popularity of the religious groups with the ANP and Nationalists taking small shares.

The elections of the District Nazims on 6 October were reflective of the trend and strengthened the PML (Q) at the cost of the Opposition.

With this overview of constitutional and political developments since 12 October 1999, let us know have a look at overall scenario:

1. The present National Assembly, the Senate and the Provincial Assemblies are not fully representative of the people. Pre-poll manipulations and selective rigging during the electoral process have compromised their legitimacy from the day one. The way some Opposition members were forced or persuaded to defect from their parties to cobble the ruling coalition had further impaired the credibility of democratic institutions.

2. The manner in which President Musharraf played his role to get Zafarullah Khan Jamali, Chaudhry Shujaat and Shaukat Aziz “elected” as the Prime Minister within a span of two years speaks volumes about the “independent character” of the National Assembly.

3. Elected from a borrowed constituency in a dubious manner and without a proper base in the party, Shaukat Aziz is a lame Prime Minister with the largest cabinet in the history of Pakistan to sustain him in the Office.

4. General Musharraf himself is in office through constitutional engineering that validated the controversial referendum of April 2002. No doubt under the then prevalent circumstances he was likely to secure a majority of votes in the referendum, but referendum itself and taking vote of confidence from the Assemblies were no proper substitute for the procedure provided in the Constitution of 1973.

5. By relenting from the pledge given to the nation that he would give up his uniform by 31 December 2004, General Musharraf greatly damaged his public image.

6. The results of recently held local body’s elections were incomprehensible and lacked transparency. The Opposition accused the government of having rigged the electoral process. The unrealistically outstanding performance of the PML (Q) in the strongholds of the PPP (Larkhana) and PML (N) (Lahore) gives credence to the allegations of large-scale electoral irregularities.

7. Bypassing the Cabinet, all vital decisions were made in the meetings of the Corps Commanders under the Chairmanship of General Musarraf, and communicated to the civilian set-up for follow-up action. The Constitution is being violated in spirit if not in letters.

It would be proper here to examine successes and failures of General Musharraf in the light of his seven-point agenda:

1. Rebuild national confidence and morale: From ‘failed state’ and ‘rogue state’ whose future seemed dark, Pakistan is now considered as a viable state. The people’s confidence in its future has been restored to a great extent. One impression needs to be dispelled that the government is doing everything at the US bidding.

2. Strengthen federation, remove inter provincial disharmony and restore national cohesion: This objective has not been achieved. The Baloch nationalists have serious grievances. The Sindhi nationalists are not prepared to accept the Kalabagh Dam project. There is no understanding in National Finance Commission over distribution of financial resources.

3. Revive economy and restore investor confidence: From the verge of collapse, the economy has taken a start for good. In the financial year 2004-2005, GDP growth was recorded at 8.4%. Due to 9/11, Pakistan’s foreign exchange reserves have crossed the figure of $ 12 billion. Increase in foreign investment is moderate, obviously due to law and order situation. The people cannot wait for benefits to trickle down. There is need to focus on poverty alleviation and distributive justice.

4. Ensure law and order and dispense speedy justice: There is hardly any success on this count. The slide downward has been checked. Thefts, robberies, violence against women, rapes, kidnappings, sectarian killings, and intolerance towards minorities continue to occur.

5. Depoliticize state institutions: In Pakistan’s political culture, this is a gigantic task. Interference with civil service and police is need of the ruling coalition. With COAS in power, the armed forces remain involved in politics as a state institution.

6. Devolution of power to the grass-roots level: Over all success on this count. The District Management Group of the civil service has been undermined. But with present socio-economic structure ___ feudal, beradari and caste system___ mostly the same political families have captured the local bodies in rural areas. Without paradigm shift in socio-economic structure, empowerment of people at grass-roots level would remain an evasive task.

7. Ensure swift and across the board accountability: According to an Advertisement Supplement published by NAB in Dawn and other newspapers on 10 October 2002 (the General Elections day), “the NAB’s actions have resulted in convictions of hitherto sacrosanct persons in all fields of public life. . . . To date 532 bureaucrats, 180 politicians, 149 businessmen and 18 armed forces personnel have been investigated.” The advertisement claimed that of those who were investigated, 499 were referred to Accountability Court for trial and 170 plea-bargained, and that the NAB recovered a total of Rs.20.9578 billion till then.

8. Without disputing the figures, one cannot but observe that for political reasons many big fishes were allowed to go when they changed over their loyalties to General Musharraf.

It is not possible to peep into somebody’s mind but it appears that presently General Musharraf is giving thought to the following options:

1. To strengthen the PML (Q) for the elections of 2007. This he can do by bringing about a ‘grand alliance’ or outright merger of the NDA, the PML (F), the PPP (Sherpao) and the PPP (Patriots) with the PML (Q). Defections can also be encouraged in the PPP and the PML (N).

2. With the majority of District Nazims at government’s disposal, it would not be difficult for the “establishment” to ensure through its hidden arms the victory of the PML (Q) led alliance.

3. Until then the present system may drag on with the tacit support of the MMA in the Parliament. The District Nazims may serve as pillars of strength at local level with their stakes in the system.

4. To resort to engineering of the Constitution and establish presidential form of government. The Constitution cannot be amended without two-third majority which the PML (Q) led coalition does not have in the present Parliament.

5. But the country’s past history is witness to extra-constitutional measures that were condoned by the Superior Judiciary on the principle of state necessity and subsequently validated by the newly elected Parliament.

6. To hold free, fair and transparent elections at the earliest. If this option is adopted the PPP is likely to secure a simple majority or to emerge as the largest party in the National Assembly. Short of two-third majority, the PPP would not be able to repe

To Be Concluded…

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